Some commentators proposed a strategy of "neo-isolationism" in the 1990s grand strategy debate, wherein the United States would deliberately attempt to protect its freedom of action. NATO's future and Asian security would be left to Europe and Asia, respectively. Some suggested using a tactic known as "selective engagement." Although they acknowledged the significance of the realist heritage, they maintained—as did Robert Art—that the first application of American military force should be to reassure allies, wherever they may be.
A peculiar fusion of the two strategies, dubbed "selective isolationism," is currently taking shape. The United States would aim to isolate itself selectively rather than engage in selective engagement. The finest example of this is the "Asia First" foreign policy strategy, which was presented in a recent Newsweek opinion piece. It implies that the US must prioritize "geopolitical efforts" in Asia above Europe in order to make strategic decisions about "resources and energy." Some argue that taking this action is not isolationist but rather a strategic necessity.
In actuality, though, the metrics already tilt American defense capabilities toward the Middle East and East Asia. The United States' remaining capabilities in Europe are a small portion of their scale during the Cold War; not much can be learned from them without developing a political mess. Isolating the critical interests of European partners because they are "less important" than those of Asia can only be detrimental to the US relationship with its Asian allies, rather than serving a strategic purpose. The US should keep reassuring its friends while engaging in targeted regional engagements because of its capabilities and dependability.
The People's Republic of China poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security, as self-described "Asia firsters" have correctly noted; yet, their evaluation of America's global standing is incorrect. The US's military contribution in Europe has decreased by two thirds from the 300,000 troops it possessed in the 1980s. Despite this downturn, Russia poses little threat in an emergency as long as the United States maintains its strong commitment to NATO. In fact, the only option to fend off Russian conventional offensives is to use NATO, allowing the US to concentrate its resources in East Asia in case Taiwan is invaded arbitrarily.
The United States has turned its attention from the Cold War to the Middle East and, more lately, the Indo-Pacific. Over 375,000 military soldiers are stationed by the United States now in at least 66 different defense facilities throughout the Indo-Pacific region (PDF). Over twice as much as the US spends in Europe, or $9.9 billion, will go into the newly created Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the Defense Department's 2025 budget. It is difficult to characterize European-focused spending as an excessive use of American "resources," given that it accounts for less than 0.5 percent of the defense budget overall. In contrast, the Pentagon continues to spend more in the Middle East than it does in the other two theaters put together—more than $17.1 billion. Should "Asia-first supporters" be driven by the desire to assist taxpayers, they would advocate for a reduction in funding.
More crucially, there are far more advantages to maintaining US capabilities in Europe than there are to moving them to Asia. More than 100,000 soldiers, a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), and other military equipment are sent to Europe by the United States. These resources are essential to NATO's eastern flank's deterrence of treaty-bound allies. To support the two Carrier Strike Groups stationed in the Pacific or the two in the Middle East, the United States might reassign the one group now in Europe. However, like the other CSGs, the Mediterranean CSG is essential to safeguarding shipping lines outside European security. Additionally, the 100,000 soldiers in Europe cannot just turn their largely Army force into a coastal island.
The conflict in Ukraine has caused a backlog in U.S. foreign military sales to Taiwan, raising questions in the public about which nation should receive priority. Proponents of "Asia first" demand that the US back Taiwan over Ukraine. However, given Taiwan's own concerns about US abandoning Ukraine, how can the US take this action? The U.S. military are diminishing, as one July RAND assessment points out, but Washington should nevertheless maintain its assistance for Ukraine and strengthen ties to turn the nation into a treaty-bound partner.
Empirically, American military might has not yet been diverted by the conflict in Ukraine. Actually, it has given the defense industrial base a boost, enabling the US to emerge stronger, and its adversaries weaker. The United States has a strategic interest in keeping this route.
The "Asia first" camp is right when it says that Europe's current shortcoming for selective participation is that it is not investing enough in defense. However, the European Union and its member states provide twice as much to Ukraine's total support than does the United States. It is untrue to say that Europe is not doing enough to support security, even though various "swap deals" have been made by European nations to provide arms to Ukraine. Though much work remains, the European Strategy for the Defense Industry may pave the way for an autonomous security export.
Particularly in East Asia, selective isolationism undermines our ties. Other Asian allies of the United States, including Taiwan, are aware of the current stakes in Europe. South Korea gave Ukraine more shells than all of Europe did, while Japan has committed more than $10 billion in help for the country. It is difficult to understand how reneging on US obligations would not be viewed negatively by them. Some allies' abandonment makes others question the dependability of their alliance. Supporting Ukraine, for example, ensures Taiwan that they would receive similar assistance if they were invaded.
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